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FOR THIS RIGHT THERE IS A REMEDY: THE NEW
MEXICO SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF EX
PARTE YOUNG TO ALLOW SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
IN GILL V. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD
JAIME R. FONTAINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a well-known phrase in American jurisprudence that states, "for every
right there should be remedy."' According to Chief Justice Marshall in the oft-cited
constitutional law case Marbury v. Madison,2 English lawyer and legal scholar Sir
William Blackstone was the source of the saying.3 For the petitioner in Marbury,
however, the phrase had little meaning, as the Court would not issue a writ of
mandamus on his behalf.4 The reality of the phrase in the wake of modem Supreme
Court Eleventh Amendment5 jurisprudence also rings hollow, as aggrieved
individuals are often unable to obtain remedies for violations of the U.S.
Constitution and federal law by the states.6
On January 11, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Kimel v.
FloridaBoard of Regents.7 In Kimel, the Court held that the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) invalidly abrogated state sovereign
immunity from private suits for money damages.9 This marked the first time in fifty
years that the Supreme Court held a federal civil rights statute unconstitutional.° In
so holding, the Court effectively foreclosed suits for damages by public employees
against their respective states for discrimination based upon age." The Kimel
decision also represented yet another expansion of the constitutionalization of state
sovereign immunity as furthered by the Rehnquist Court. 2 Just one year after Kimel
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than the last.
1. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 616 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 163 ("[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy,, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *23)).
4. Id. at 180.
5. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects
of any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
6. See Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, 27,45 P.3d 876, 888; Pamela
S. Karlan, The Irony oflmmunity: The Eleventh Amendment, IrreparableInjury, andSection 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1311, 1326 (2001) ("(Tlhe Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, by foreclosing damages suits, deprives
private parties of an adequate remedy at law for conceded violations of their rights.").
7. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
9. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66.
10. Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, LitigatingAge and Disability Claims Against State and
Local Government Employers in the New "Federalism" Era,22 BERKELEY J. EMI. & LAB. L. 99 (2001).
11. See id.
12. See generally Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002)
(discussing the revival of "judicially enforceable federalism" by the Rehnquist-led Supreme Court).
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was decided, the Court issued its decision in Boardof Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett.3 In Garrett,the Court explicitly held open the possibility that
public employees could seek prospective, injunctive relief for violations of federal
law under the doctrine of Exparte Young 4 even when the relevant statute itself did
not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity from monetary damages. 5
Three years prior to the Garrettdecision, firefighter James Gill learned that he
was not entitled to retirement benefits after twenty-two years of service with the
Hondo Volunteer Fire Department.' 6 Gill had joined the Department at age fortynine, making him ineligible for benefits under New Mexico law. 7 In 2000, after
exhausting his administrative remedies, Gill filed suit, alleging a violation of the
ADEA.' 8
Gill's claim was dismissed on state sovereign immunity grounds. 9 In reversing
the court of appeals and allowing Gill's suit to proceed, the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision presented an opportunity for the court to build upon and clarify its
20
earlier decision in Cockrell v. Board of Regents of New Mexico State University.
Gill's case also provided the court with an opportunity to further clarify the
application of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of Exparte Young in New
Mexico.'
This Note first describes the historical background and context of state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and the development of the doctrine of
Ex parte Young.22 Second, the Note discusses the application of both sovereign
immunity and Ex parte Young in New Mexico, focusing on the New Mexico
Supreme Court's decision in Gill v. Public Employees Retirement Board,23 the
court's most recent attempt to clarify the role of the judiciary in the application and
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 24 Finally, this Note argues that, while the
court's decision in Gill was a correct application of Exparte Young, the court did
not adequately discuss the prior precedent of Cockrell.25

13.
14.
15.
16.
(2004).

531 U.S. 356 (2001).
209 U.S. 123 (1908); see discussion infra Part H.C.
Garrett,531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2004-NMSC-016, 1 2, 90 P.3d 491, 494, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 321

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

2, 90 P.3d at 494.
4, 90 P.3d at 494; see infra note 149.
2, 90 P.3d at 494. "A major limit on the federal judicial power-and now on the authority of state

courts as well--is the doctrine of sovereign immunity." ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 393 (4th ed.
2003). A state's immunity from certain types of suits, also known as state sovereign immunity, "is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution and which they retain
today except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments." Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 713 (1999); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty

not to be amendable to the suit of an individual without its consent.").
20. 2002-NMSC-009, 45 P.3d 876.
21.

See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016,

1,90 P.3d at 493-94.

22. See discussion infra Parts II.A-C.
23. 2004-NMSC-016, 90 P.3d 491.

24. See discussion infra Parts I, IV.
25. See discussion infra Part V.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the Eleventh Amendment
The history of state sovereign immunity in the United States has been much
debated and seriously questioned by numerous commentators, scholars, and
Supreme Court justices.26 When examining the roots of state sovereign immunity in
American jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court often begins its analysis with a
nod to English law.27 Under English law, "it was well established... that the Crown
could not be sued without consent in its own courts."2 Although it is apparent that
the Framers rejected many aspects of English law and political theory,29 state

sovereign immunity was a matter of concern for the states, many of which were
"heavily indebted as a result of the Revolutionary War."3 This concern was
especially apparent during the ratification debates in which the Framers discussed
in the
the role of state sovereign immunity in the newly formed nation.31 A key issue
32
debates was the meaning of Article HII, Section Two of the Constitution.
Article IN, Section Two33 defines the scope of federal judicial power and contains
two clauses that deal specifically with suits against states.34 These sections permit
suits "between a State and Citizens of different States" and "[b]etween a State, or

26. LAURENCE H. TRINE, AMEmcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 529 (3d ed. 2000); see also Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974) ("The historical basis of the Eleventh Amendment has been oft stated, and it represents
one of the more dramatic examples of this Court's effort to derive meaning from the document given to the Nation
by the Framers nearly 200 years ago.").
27. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999). According to Blackstone, the "preeminent authority on
English law for the founding generation[,]...'[h]ence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king,
even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of
power."' Id. (quoting 1 WiLLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *234-35).
28. Id. Whether the American formulation of sovereign immunity truly has its roots in English law is a
matter of considerable debate. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 519 n.2; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("There is almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought sovereign immunity was
fundamental in the sense of being unalterable.").
29. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
30. Id. at 716. Additional concerns for the states "included the desire to avoid suits seeking restitution of
confiscated Loyalist property and the desire to retain lands placed in the public domain by legislative fiat." TRIBE,
supra note 26, at 521 n.15.
31. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 716 ("The ratification debates.. .underscored the importance of the States'
sovereign immunity to the American people.").
32. Id. At the state ratification conventions, one group of delegates argued that Article III "clearly made
states subject to suit in federal court." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 398. Another group argued that Article i
did not abrogate state sovereign immunity and that states could only be sued in federal courts if they consented. Id.
at 399-400. "This recounting of the ratification debates reveals that there was no consensus, even among the
Constitution's supporters, about whether state sovereign immunity survived Article Ill." Id.at 400.
33. Article 111,Section Two of the U.S. Constitution provides that
[t]he judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;-to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United States shall be a
party;-to controversies between two or more states;-between a state and citizens of another
state;-between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens or subjects.
34. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 19, at 398.
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the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects....,, 35 These clauses
appear to allow for suits based upon diversity of citizenship where the state is a
party: so-called "citizen-state" diversity cases.36 Additionally, Article III defines
federal judicial power as extending to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties., 37 This clause allows
for suits based upon a federal question.3 8 Thus, at first glance, one might assume that
Article III, Section Two permitted private suits against states in two ways: (1) a
citizen of one state may sue another state based upon diversity or federal question
subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) an individual may sue the state of the
individual's citizenship on a claim arising out of a federal question.39 In the
infamous case, Chisholm v. Georgia,40 the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Article
II, Section Two as expressly allowing for citizen-state diversity suits against a state
by a citizen of another state. 4 '
Chisholm, decided in 1793, was the first case in which the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to determine whether "sovereign immunity survived Article I."' In
Chisholm, a creditor from South Carolina sued Georgia seeking payment for goods
he had provided to Georgia during the Revolutionary War.43 The Court allowed the
suit to proceed against the non-consenting state, holding that "[t]he Constitution...
provides for the jurisdiction wherein a State is a party, in the following instances:
-1 st. Controversies between two or more States. 2d. Controversies between a State
and citizens of another State. 3d. Controversies between a State, and foreign States,
citizens, or subjects." Justice Iredell was the lone dissenter, arguing that Article III
did not support such a broad reading. 45 The Chisholm decision created "such a shock
of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter,
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed."'
Shortly after, the Eleventh Amendment was passed by both houses of Congress and
was forwarded to the states for their approval.47 The Eleventh Amendment states that

35.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 2.

36. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 522.
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 522.
39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 398.

40. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
41.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 401.

42. Id. at 400.
43. See William Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1989).
44. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 431.
45. Id. at 432-33.
46. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). In response to the decision, Georgia passed a bill "providing
that anyone attempting to enforce the Chisholm decision would be 'guilty of felony and shall suffer death, without
benefit of clergy, by being hanged."' Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720-21 (1999) (quoting DAVID CURRIE, THE
CONSTITTION INCONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 196 (1997)).
47. Alden, 527 U.S. at 721 (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 25 (1795)). In drafting the Eleventh Amendment,
six different versions were considered, with "[o]ver a year elaps[ing] between the introduction of the first proposal
and final approval of the amendment." TRIBE, supra note 26, at 522. According to Laurence H. Tribe, this indicates
that the drafting of the Eleventh Amendment was not as "hasty" as some scholars and judges argue, perhaps
suggesting that Congress intended the Amendment's "narrow" wording. Id. at 521. For example, the first postChisholm proposal, introduced by Rep. Theodore Sedgwick, "would have categorically prohibited federal courts
from entertaining suits in which states were party defendants" regardless of who brought the suit Id. at 522 n.18.
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"[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."' With
"swiftness and near unanimity," the Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1795."
B. The Constitutionalizationof Sovereign Immunity
At first glance, the Eleventh Amendment appeared only to apply state sovereign
immunity to citizen-state diversity jurisdiction cases because its language only
barred suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State."5 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana"
interpreted the text of the Eleventh Amendment more broadly than its text would
indicate." In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana brought suit against the State of Louisiana
in order to obtain payment on bond coupons, claiming "that the state's failure to
honor its bond obligations violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution."5 3 The
claim in Hans, therefore, was not based upon diversity of citizenship but rather on
a federal question arising under the U.S. Constitution." While recognizing that the
Eleventh Amendment had only previously been applied to bar suits brought against
a state by a citizen of another state, the Court stated that it was absurd for the
Eleventh Amendment to only apply to diversity suits and not to suits brought under
a federal question as well:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the
federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign
states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the
Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein
contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that

48. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
49. Alden, 527 U.S. at 724.
50. U.S CONST. amend. XI; see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,276 (1986); see also TRIBE, supranote 26,
at 530 ("Because the Eleventh Amendment precisely tracks the language in Article 111providing for citizen-state
diversity jurisdiction, it is most plausible to infer that the amendment addresses only the Diversity Clauses."). Early
Supreme Court cases also suggest that the Court itself subscribed to the view that the Eleventh Amendment only
barred suits based upon diversity jurisdiction. TRIBE, supranote 26, at 531 (citing Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857-58 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821)).
51. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
52. TRIBE, supranote 26, at 523. According to constitutional scholar Laurence H. Tribe,
[tihere are two possible readings of the Eleventh Amendment's test. First, it could be interpreted
as repealing the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article 111for all cases in which a state
appears as defendant. Such a construction would leave states subject to suit in federal court by
out-of-state or foreign citizens based on federal question subject-matter jurisdiction.
Alternatively, the Eleventh Amendment could be construed as stripping the federal courts of
jurisdiction in any case brought by an out-of-state or foreign citizen, even if jurisdiction might
rest on a question of federal law. But according to the prevailing view on the Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Amendment goes far beyond either of these readings.
Id. at 522.
53. Id.; see also Hans, 134 U.S. at 1-2.
54. TRIBE, supranote 26, at 523.
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it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face.55
After Hans, it was clear that the Eleventh Amendment did not solely function to
prohibit suits against a state by citizens of another state, but also to prohibit suits
against a state by citizens of that state.56 Hans, therefore, stands "for the proposition
that sovereign immunity bars even suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States." 57 In other words, the Eleventh Amendment applies both to diversity
jurisdiction cases and to federal question cases, regardless of the citizenship of the
plaintiff.5"

There have been over 200 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Eleventh
Amendment, with little agreement as to its meanings and prohibitions.5 The debate
surrounding the Eleventh Amendment invokes a clear "tension between state
sovereign immunity and the desire to have in place mechanisms for the effective
vindication of federal rights."'W At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court was
"split five to four over the issue of sovereign immunity.",6' The majority of justices
have declared that the Eleventh Amendment "reflects a broad constitutional
principle of sovereign immunity. 6 2 Under this theory, the Eleventh Amendment is
a "restriction on the subject matterjurisdiction of the federal courts that bars all suits
against state governments." 63 The minority view takes the position that modem
jurisprudence on the Eleventh Amendment is, quite simply, "bad law." According
to the minority view, the Eleventh Amendment is only a limit on suits based solely
upon citizen-state diversity jurisdiction, which would only serve to bar suits by a
citizen of one state against a state in which the citizen does not reside, provided that

55. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
56. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 19, at 404.
57. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 523; see also Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 668 (1999) ("Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against
one State by citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long recognized that the Eleventh Amendment
accomplished much more.").
58. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 394.
60. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 519.
61. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 396. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, formed the majority, while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer formed
the minority. Id. at 397.
62. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989), overruledby Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 66 (1996).
63. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 403.
64. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 293 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635,649 n.1 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I set aside for
the moment my continuing conviction that the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that a majority of this
Court has embraced is fundamentally mistaken."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 96 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court's conclusion that the judgemade doctrine of sovereign immunity limits Congress' power to authorize private parties... to enforce federal law
against the States."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's enhancement
of the Amendment was at odds with constitutional history and at war with the conception of divided sovereignty
that is the essence of American federalism."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 185 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[N]either text, precedent, nor history supports the majority's abdication of our responsibility to
exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to us in Article lM."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
127 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable misapplication
of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity.").
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there is no other independent basis for jurisdiction, such as a federal question.65
Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment does nothing to limit a suit based upon
federal question jurisdiction, regardless of where the citizen resides." To hold
otherwise is to ignore that "[i]n this country the sovereignty of the individual States
is subordinate both to the citizenry of each State and to the supreme law of the
federal sovereign. 6 7
Nevertheless, under the prevailing view,68 sovereign immunity has broadened at
the expense of congressional power to subject the states to federal laws.69 Suits
against states by federal corporations,7" foreign nations,7 Indian tribes, 72 and suits
in admiralty73 have all been prohibited under the Court's state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. More recently, the Eleventh Amendment has been
extended to pro74
hibit private suits against nonconsenting states in state courts.
There are, however, a few ways in which to circumvent state sovereign immunity
and subject a state to suit.75 The Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine76 laid out three
instances where state sovereign immunity is not a bar to a suit against a state.77 In
the first of these instances, state sovereign immunity is not a bar to a suit when a
state consents to the suit. 78 According to the Alden decision, consent can occur in a

65. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 529 ("Under the diversity theory, the Amendment precludes federal jurisdiction
over suits against states only when the sole basis of that jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship and has no effect on
suits asserting some other basis for federal jurisdiction, such as federal question jurisdiction or admiralty
jurisdiction."); see also CHEMERINSKY, supranote 19, at 403.
66. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 793 n.28; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 101-02 (Souter, J., dissenting); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 403.

67. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Papasan,478 U.S. at 292 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("It is highly unlikely that, having created a system in which federal law was to be supreme, the
Framers of the Constitution or of the Eleventh Amendment nonetheless intended for that law to be unenforceable
in the broad class of cases now barred by this Court's precedents.").
68. "[A]ccording to the prevailing view on the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment goes far beyond"
the language of the Amendment itself. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 522; see Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition.. .which it confirms: that the states entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact;
that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty.").
69. Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2004-NMSC-016, 1 5, 90 P.3d 491, 495; see also Vicki Jackson,
Principleand Compromisein ConstitutionalAdjudication:The Eleventh Amendment andState Sovereign Immunity,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953 (2000); Massey, supra note 12, at 432.
70. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). A federal corporation is a type of government entity created by
the federal government through a congressional charter. A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government
Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 543, 546. Examples of federal corporations include the Federal Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Id.at 550.
71. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
72. Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775.
73. Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). However, the Supreme Court has allowed in rem actions in
admiralty suits against states in certain circumstances. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 412 (citing California v.
Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491 (1998); Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982)).
74. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of
the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts....").
75. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 409. While some Justices advocate relying on the good faith of states,
see Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 ("We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey
the binding laws of the United States."), the Court for the most part has been "unwilling.. .to trust state courts
completely to uphold and enforce the Constitution and federal laws... [and has] devised a number of ways to
circumvent the broad prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 394.
76. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
77. Id. at 755-56.
78. Id.
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variety of ways. For example, a state can pass its own legislation consenting to a
type of suit. 79 States have also impliedly consented to "some suits pursuant to the
plan of the Convention or to subsequent Constitutional Amendments."" This
includes consent to suits brought by the Federal Government"' or by other states.8 2
The Federal Government may also invoke state consent to private suits by enacting
appropriate legislation. 3 State consent is invoked even in instances in which a
particular state does not actually consent to suit, based on the notion that in ratifying
the Constitution and adopting various amendments, states have willingly surrendered portions of their sovereignty, thereby impliedly consenting to suits based upon
certain constitutional provisions.8 4 According to current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the only appropriate legislation by which Congress may directly abrogate
state sovereign immunity, thereby invoking implicit state consent to suit, is

legislation passed pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 However, even if legislation is passed pursuant to Congress's Section Five powers, it still
does not abrogate state sovereign immunity if Congress exceeded its powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment."
In order for Congress to exercise its Section Five powers to properly abrogate
state sovereign immunity, it must first unequivocally express its intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity within the text of the legislation. 7 Secondly, the
legislation itself must be valid legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Valid
legislation under Congress's Section Five powers must be "designed to prevent or
remedy constitutional violations" of the rights encompassed in Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 9 To properly exercise its Section Five powers, Congress
79. Id.; see, e.g., Bachmeier v. Hoffman, I P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2000) ("Although states and arms of the
state may be immune from suit under the FLSA, states can waive their sovereign immunity. Wyoming has enacted
a limited waiver of immunity for governmental entities manifested in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.")
(citation omitted).
80. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56.
81. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621
(1892).
82. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56; see, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
83. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
84. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56.
85. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("We have held
also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the States to surrender a portion of the
sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private
suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power."); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976). Previously, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court held that Congress could
abrogate state sovereign immunity by passing legislation pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause. Id.
at 19-20. The Court's decision in Union Gas Co., however, was overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida.517 U.S.
at 65-66. In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress could only pass legislation abrogating state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
86. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 949. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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must identify a pattern of unconstitutional discriminatory conduct by the states and
then enact prophylactic legislation that is narrowly tailored to remedy such discrimination.90 Under recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, legislation "must exhibit
'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end' in order to be considered a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
The Court dealt with the issue of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers in
Kimel, where the Court had to decide if the ADEA validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity.92 The Supreme Court had previously held that in passing the ADEA,
Congress properly acted within its powers under the Commerce Clause.93 However,
after the Court in Seminole Tribe effectively foreclosed the ability of Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity via the Commerce Clause,94 a key question that
remained was whether the ADEA was a valid exercise of Congress's Section Five,
Fourteenth Amendment powers.95 In Kimel, the Supreme Court answered that
question with a resounding no." The Court held that, although Congress had clearly
expressed its desire to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the ADEA, the Act
itself exceeded Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.97 In holding that the ADEA exceeded Congress's power, the Court concluded
that "[o]lder persons.. .unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis of race
9
or gender, have not been subjected to a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment.""'
Further, in the absence of a pattern of past discrimination, the Court held that the
ADEA was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that
it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior." 99 The ADEA, therefore, did not properly abrogate state sovereign

90. SeeKimel, 528 U.S. at91.
91. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 528 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). In Hibbs, the Court held that public employees "may recover money damages in the event
of the State's failure to comply with the family-care provision" of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). Hibbs, 528 U.S. at 724. The FMLA's family-leave provision was held enforceable
against the states for private suits because Congress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity by passing the
Act pursuant to its Section Five, Fourteenth Amendment powers. Id. at 735. According to Stanford Law professor
Pamela S. Karlan,
[a]brogation of sovereign immunity is now limited to situations in which Congress can use its
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, and, after City ofBoerne v. Flores,that
power is circumscribed by the requirement that there be a demonstrable "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." Thus, absent a substantial danger of widespread unconstitutional behavior by the states,
Section 5 based abrogation is unavailable.
Karlan, supranote 6, at 1316.
92. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
94. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
95. Id. at 59 ("[O]ur inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States'
immunity from suit is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?"); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79 ("[l]f the ADEA rests solely
on Congress's Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against
their state employers.").
96. 528U.S.at9l.
97. Id. at 66.
98. Id. at 83 (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam)).
99. Id. at 86 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1997)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

immunity.'"u However, even if there has been no valid congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity, a litigant may still invoke one of the other two exceptions
to sovereign immunity.
The second exception to sovereign immunity includes suits brought by private
citizens against an entity that is not considered an arm of the state."0 ' Such entities
include municipal corporations and other governmental entities.0 2 The final
exception to state sovereign immunity is suits for prospective injunctive or
declaratory relief against a state officer. 0 ' This exception is known as the doctrine
of Ex parte Young."
C. The Legal Fiction of Ex Parte Young
Providing a "necessary way of reconciling state sovereign immunity with the
principles embodied in the Supremacy Clause and Article 111, ' 05 the doctrine of Ex
parte Young has its roots in a case of the same name decided in 1908.06 In the
"landmark case,"'0 7 the Supreme Court held that, under the Eleventh Amendment,
"suits to enjoin violations of federal law by state officers are not barred."'0 8 Under
the doctrine of Exparte Young, a plaintiff can avoid a state sovereign immunity bar
provided that a violation of federal law is alleged; a state official rather than the state
is named as a defendant; and prospective, injunctive relief is requested.'0 9 This
doctrine has been in use for almost a century and "has been accepted as necessary
to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials
responsible to the 'supreme authority of the United States."'"o However, the Court
has also recognized that under Ex parte Young, a key tension between the
vindication of federal rights and the preservation of the sovereign immunity of the
states still exists."'

100. Id. at 91 ("In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive requirements, and the lack of
evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States... [tihe ADEA's purported abrogation
of the States' sovereign immunity is accordingly invalid.").
101. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
102. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning,
133 U.S. 529 (1890)).
103. Id.
104. Exparte Young "has been heralded as 'one of the three most important decisions the Supreme Court of
the United States has ever handed down."' CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 419 (quoting Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 564 (E.D. Ohio 1979)).
105. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 557.
106. See ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,664 (1974) ("Ex
parte Young was a watershed case in which this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action in
the federal courts seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a statute claimed to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.").
107. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (describing Exparte Young).
108. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60; see also CHEMERINSKY, supranote 19, at 420.
109. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 535.
110. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (quoting ExparteYoung, 209 U.S.
at 160); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 420 ("The decision in Exparte Young long has been recognized
as a primary method of limiting the effect of the Eleventh Amendment and of ensuring state compliance with federal
law.").
111. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosjp., 465 U.S. at 105.
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Commonly called a "fiction""' 2 by the Supreme Court, the doctrine of Ex parte
Young is based on the notion that when a state officer acts in violation of federal law
or the Constitution, even though the official's actions may be well within the bounds
of state law, the officer is stripped of "official or representative character," is subject
to "the consequences of [the] conduct," and is therefore no longer protected by a
state's sovereign immunity. 13 The fiction lies in the obvious
truth that the suit
4
against the state official is in reality a suit against the state."
"As part of its federalism agenda, the Supreme Court has chipped away at the Ex
parte Young exception.""' 5 In Edelman v. Jordan,"6 the Court limited Ex parte
Young to claims for prospective, injunctive relief, holding that granting retroactive
relief for a suit against a state officer is virtually indistinguishable from granting a
monetary judgment against the state itself."7 The Court further limited the doctrine
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman"' when it held that suits
invoking Ex parte Young must be based upon violations of federal law, as opposed
to violations of state law." 9
In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that Exparte Young cannot
be applied in cases in which special state interests are invoked, 2 ° or for suits based
on violations of federal statutes that have comprehensive remedial schemes. 2' In
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,122 the Supreme Court held that Idaho had a "unique
sovereign interest in submerged land within its borders," and did not permit a suit
under Exparte Young. 2 3 Furthermore, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 24 the Supreme
Court dismissed an Ex parte Young suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
because the statute had "its own comprehensive, and exclusive, enforcement
mechanisms. "125

112. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997).
113. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 160; see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("The theory of
Young was that an unconstitutional statute is void and therefore does not 'impart to [the official] any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."' (quoting Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 160)).
114. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 421.
115. Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 10, at 109.
116. 415U.S. 651(1974).
117. Id. at 663; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("When the action
is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is
entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.").
118. 465U.S. 89(1984).
119. Id. at 106.
120. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1997). Coeurd'Alene Tribe also raised issues
regarding how Ex parte Young should be applied. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 565. Justice Kennedy, who was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued for an interpretation of the doctrine that would require a balancing of state
interests when deciding whether Ex parte Young is applicable in a given case. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at
278-80; see also TRIBE, supra note 26, at 565. On the other hand, Justice O'Connor argued against this ad hoc
balancing, supporting instead a straightforward inquiry into whether a plaintiff has alleged an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks the appropriate relief allowed under Exparte Young. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 291-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also TRIBE, supranote 26, at 565.
121. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996).
122. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
123. Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2004-NMSC-016, 18, 90 P.3d 491, 497 (citing Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. at 283).
124. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
125. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 18, 90 P.3d at 498 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74).
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In the wake of the Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
many questioned the future of Ex parte Young.'26 However, with the Court's
decision in Verizon Maryland,Inc. v. PublicService Commission,127 Exparte Young
appears to retain its vitality, at least for the time being.' 28 In Verizon Maryland,Inc.,
the Court allowed a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to proceed under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young, holding that "[i]n determining whether the doctrine of
Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only
conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing29
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective."
In this sense, the Court appeared to reaffirm the viability of Ex parte Young,
a substantial narrowing of the ability to sue state officers is not
suggesting "that
130
imminent.'
With the Supreme Court narrowing the instances in which Congress can properly
abrogate state sovereign immunity, a question emerged as to whether Ex parte
Young could be used to enforce a federal statute that itself had invalidly abrogated
state sovereign immunity. 31 The Court's answer to this question lay in a footnote
in its Garrettdecision:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I [of
the ADA] does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse
against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable
to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for
money damages, as well32as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young.1
The Court in Garrett,therefore, expressly held open the possibility that a law that
exceeded Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment could
under the doctrine of Exparte Young or through
still be enforced against the states
33
suit by the federal government.
The situation addressed in the Garrettfootnote had not previously been dealt with
by the New Mexico Supreme Court. The court's most recent opinion involving the
Eleventh Amendment was Cockrell v. Board of Regents of New Mexico State
University134 Cockrell involved a suit against the Board of Regents of New Mexico
State University alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA). 135 Fletcher Cockrell, a former assistant basketball coach at the school,

126. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 438; see also TRIBE, supra note 26, at 558 ("The Court has itself
manifested discomfort with Ex parte Young's imperfect reflection of the state sovereign immunity principles that
at least a majority of the Court believes were constitutionalized by the Eleventh Amendment.").
127. 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
128. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1 19, 90 P.3d at 498.
129. Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 645 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)).
130. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 19, at 438-39.

131.
Automatic
132.
133.
134.
135.

See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 374 n.9 (2001); State Police for
Ret. Ass'n v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 20, 90 P.3d at 498-99.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
See id.
2002-NMSC-009, 45 P.3d 876.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 1, 45 P.3d at 878.
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sought monetary damages in the form of compensation for overtime hours
worked. 3' 6 In dismissing Cockrell's claim, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
New Mexico had not waived its sovereign immunity from FLSA claims in state
court; therefore, Cockrell could not assert a claim against the state under the federal
statute.'3 7 The court recognized that Congress could no longer abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers and, because the
FLSA was passed pursuant to those powers, the attempt by Congress to abrogate
state sovereign immunity within the legislation was invalid. 3 s In the absence of
proper congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity, the court stated that
only the state legislature, and not the courts, could waive state sovereign immunity
for private suits for damages under a federal statute.'39 It was in the wake of that
decision that the New Mexico Supreme Court was faced with the scenario presented
in the Garrett footnote: could retired firefighter James Gill sue the State of New
Mexico under the doctrine of Exparte Young for violations of the ADEA, a statute
previously held to invalidly abrogate state sovereign immunity?"4

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
James Gill joined the Hondo Volunteer Fire Department in 1974 at the age of
49141 Gill began as a charter member and during his twenty-two years of service
filled various positions within the Department, including engineer, fireman, and
chief.'42 When he retired in 1997, Gill applied for retirement benefits, believing that
he was entitled to $100 per month.'4 3 Gill was denied benefits by the Public
Employees Retirement Board.'"
The Public Employees Retirement Board (PERB) is a state agency that acts as a
trustee for retirement funds managed by the Public Employees Retirement
Association of New Mexico (PERA). 45 According to the PERB, Gill was ineligible
for benefits: "Because you were over the age of 45 in 1979, the year in which you
first could have acquired a service credit, YOU DO NOT QUALIFY to be a member
and therefore do not qualify for the benefits under the Volunteer Firefighters
Retirement Act.' ' 146 The PERB based its decision on the Volunteer Firefighters
Retirement Act (VFRA), 1 47 which defined an eligible member as a "volunteer
firefighter whose first year of service credit was accumulated 'no later than the year

136. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ( 1, 3, 45 P.3d at 878.
137. Id. 2, 45 P.3d at 878.
138. Id.1 14, 45 P.3d at 883.
139. Id.1 15, 45 P.3d at 884.
140. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 20, 90 P.3d at 498-99.
141. Id. 12, 90 P.3d at 494.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. NMSA 1978, § 10-1 1A-2 (1983) (amended 2003). The New Mexico Legislature amended the VFRA
in 2003, extending its coverage to "volunteer firefighters whose first year of service credit was accumulated during
or after the year the firefighter attained the age of 16." Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 3, 90 P.3d at 494. Unfortunately
for Gill, the amendment had no retroactive effect and therefore did not apply to current retirees. See id.
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which he attained the age of forty-five."" 4 Gill filed a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the New Mexico Human Rights
Division, charging that the VFRA violated the ADEA by discriminating against him
based upon his age149
After receiving a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC, 50 Gill filed a lawsuit in the
Santa Fe County District Court against the PERB, requesting "declaratory relief, and
an injunction that would require the PERB to discontinue enforcement of Section
10-1 1A-2(E)....""' As a defense, the PERB asserted that the claim was barred by
state sovereign immunity. 5 2 The district court held that sovereign immunity did bar
the claim and dismissed the case.'53 The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decision.' 54
In his appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Gill put forth two arguments
in support of his claim that sovereign immunity was not a bar to his suit.'55 His first
156
argument was that suits brought under the New Mexico Declaratory Judgment Act
did not invoke sovereign immunity concerns because the State had waived sovereign
immunity by enacting the legislation. 157 Gill's second argument was that his claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief fell squarely within the doctrine of Ex parte
Young and therefore were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.' 5 The court of

148. NMSA 1978, § 10-1 1A-2 (1983) (amended 2003), cited in Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 3, 90 P.3d at 494.
149. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 4, 90 P.3d at 494. The ADEA prohibits discrimination based solely on age
against employees aged forty and over. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for employers:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
150. When an individual believes that his or her employment rights have been violated, he or she may file
a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, FILING A CHARGE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overviewchargefiling.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). The EEOC will then
investigate the charge by interviewing individuals, visiting the place of employment, and reviewing documents. U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC'S CHARGE PROCESSING PROCEDURES, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview -charge-processinghtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). If the EEOC determines
that the evidence establishes that discrimination has occurred, the EEOC will inform the parties and attempt to
conciliate the case, going to court if necessary. Id. If the EEOC decides not to pursue the case, the EEOC will issue
a "right-to-sue" letter to the charging party and the aggrieved individual is then free to bring suit on his or her own.
Id.
151. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1 4, 90 P.3d at 494.
152. Id.; see supra note 19.
153. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 4, 90 P.3d at 494.
154. Id.
155. Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2003-NMCA-038, 1, 62 P.3d 1227, 1228.
156. NMSA 1978, §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1975). The Act provides that
the state of New Mexico.. .may be sued and declaratory judgment entered when the rights, status
or other legal relations of the parties call for a construction of the constitution of the state of New
Mexico, the constitution of the United States or any of the laws of the state of New Mexico or
the U.S., or any statute thereof.
NMSA 1978, § 44-6-13.
157. Gill, 2003-NMCA-038, 1, 62 P.3d at 1228.
158. Id.

Summer 2005]

SUITS AGAINST THE STATE

appeals rejected Gill's first argument, holding that the New Mexico Declaratory
Judgment Act was a procedural statute that did not contain a waiver of state
Gill's Ex parte Young argument was also rejected." 6
sovereign immunity.'
According to the court of appeals, because congressional abrogation of sovereign
immunity through the ADEA was outside the scope of Congress's constitutional
6
powers, Ex parte Young was not applicable.' 6
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 4, 2003.162 In
reversing the New Mexico Court of Appeals, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that state
sovereign immunity did not bar Gill's claim under the doctrine of Exparte
163
Young.

IV. RATIONALE
Writing for the majority, Justice Bosson began the New Mexico Supreme Court's
decision in Gill by reiterating that New Mexico's constitutional sovereign immunity
comes from two sources: the U.S. Constitution and current Supreme Court
precedent."64 The court further noted that it would continue to "clarify the contours
of that immunity" by defining limited exceptions to state constitutional sovereign
immunity. 65 According to the court, under recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has expanded and
limited to its
the ability of Congress to abrogate state sovereign
66 immunity has been
Section Five, Fourteenth Amendment powers.1
The court stated that, post-Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court has decided that
numerous federal statutes cannot be enforced against states without their consent,
regardless of the statutes' validity, because Congress had "exceeded its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 67 As controlling precedent, the court
cited Kimel and Garrett.16' The court noted that, in Kimel, the Supreme Court held
that Congress had exceeded its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment in enacting the ADEA's enforcement provisions against the states. 169
Similarly, the court cited Garrettfor the Supreme Court's holding that Congress had
once again exceeded its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
by "enacting the enforcement provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) against the states."'7 0 Based on this precedent, the court concluded that it

159. Id. 7, 62 P.3d at 1229.
160. Id. 12, 62 P.3d at 1230.
161. Id.
162. See Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d 516 (2003) (granting writ of certiorari
without published opinion).
163. Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2004-NMSC-016, 1, 90 P.3d 491,494.
164. Id.1 1, 90 P.3d at 493 (citing Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents, 2002-NMSC-009, 45 P.3d 876).
165. Id.
166. See id.qft 5-6, 90 P.3d at 495.
167. Id.1 7, 90 P.3d at 495; see supranotes 87-100 and accompanying text.
168. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016,1 7, 90 P.3d at 495 (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)).
169. Id. (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. 62); see supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
170. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 7, 90 P.3d at 495 (citing Garrett,531 U.S. 356).
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must start from the premise that the ADEA cannot be enforced in federal court by
private citizens against the state unless the state consents.17'
Additionally, the court in Gill recognized that the scope of state sovereign
immunity had been expanded to include claims brought in state court as well as
federal court. 72 In Alden, the Supreme Court held for the first time that Congress did
not have the authority to subject non-consenting states to FLSA claims brought in
state court. 173 Although Alden was seen as an expansion of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the court in Gill noted that the Supreme Court also limited the scope of
that immunity by recognizing two already-existing exceptions to state sovereign
immunity. 74 In addition to the traditional exception to sovereign immunity, which
is state consent to suit, the court stated that the other Alden exceptions included suits
against an entity that is not considered an "arm of the state" and suits for
prospective, injunctive relief against state officers under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.' 75 According to the court, these exceptions "describe limited circumstances
under which.. .a federal statutory claim does not unduly encroach upon a state's
autonomy or core sovereign interests."' 76 Therefore, reasoned the court, when one
of these exceptions is present in a suit, the facts no longer support sovereign
immunity and the suit should "proceed in deference to federal law and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution."' 77 According to the court, this
deference is part of a good faith obligation of the states to respect federal law and
is part of what is known as the federalist compact. 78 Under the federalist compact,
the court noted that states are "entitled to the immunity necessary to preserve their
autonomy" in exchange for maintaining a good faith obligation to respect the
supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and federal law.' 79
Noting that Gill's first claim was that New Mexico had consented to his lawsuit
through its enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act,' the court quickly rejected
that argument.' Choosing not to revisit well-established law, the court shifted its
focus to the other possible Alden exceptions to sovereign immunity, stating that the

171. Id.
172. Id. 1 8, 90 P.3d at 495 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711 (1999)); see supranotes 87-100 and
accompanying text.
173. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 9, 90 P.3d at 495 (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 747).
174. Id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 756).
175. Id. (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 756); see supra notes 105-133 and accompanying text.
176. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 10, 90 P.3d at 495-96.
177. Id. 1 10, 90 P.3d at 496.
178. Id.
179. Id. The Court in Alden defined the federalist compact as a compact between the states and the federal
government, stating that "[lt]he good faith of the States...provides an important assurance" that the Constitution of
the United States and federal law will be the "supreme law of the land." Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. "Thus, under the
federalist compact, the obligation of states to respect federal law and rights created thereunder is an essential
corollary of state sovereign immunity." Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1 10, 90 P.3d at 496.
180. NMSA 1978, § 44-6-13 (1975); see supra note 156.
181. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 11, 90 P.3d at 465. Contrary to Gill's argument, the court concluded that
the Act did not create a general consent to suit that would bring Gill's suit under the first of the three sovereign
immunity exceptions. Id. Rather, the Act simply permitted parties to bring a suit against the state when the state had
already consented. Id.
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use of the doctrine of Ex parte Young"8 2 for prospective, injunctive relief was the
exception most applicable to the case at bar.'83
A. Exparte Young
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had concluded
that the Ex parte Young doctrine was inapplicable in this case due to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Kimel, which held that the ADEA did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity. '8 The supreme court in Gill rejected this
conclusion, stating that such a belief was both incorrect and in direct conflict with
Alden and a prior New Mexico case, Cockrell v. Board of Regents of New Mexico
State University.185 The New Mexico Supreme Court found that, under the court of
appeals' analysis, Kimel would have such a broad application that sovereign
immunity would violate the federalist compact, not to mention good faith. 86
beyond "New Mexico's core
Sovereign immunity' 8in
7 such instances would extend
sovereign interests."'
The court further noted that sovereign immunity should not "undermine the
validity of federal legislation.' ' 188 With respect to federal legislation, the court noted
that, although there are instances in which individuals cannot bring suit against the
state for violations of a federal statute, such legislation still remains "valid and in
effect, even if [it] may not be enforced in all instances and against all defendants.' 89
In other words, federal statutes, such as the ADEA, are not made unconstitutional
or invalidated by the existence of state sovereign immunity in a particular suit. 9
Based on this understanding, the court concluded that the proper analysis was not
whether the provisions of the ADEA could be enforced against New Mexico but,
rather, what remedies were "available when state officials violate federal law."' 19
B. Application ofExparte Young to Gill
In order to decide what remedies were available to Gill, the court had to decide
if his claims fell under any exception to sovereign immunity. 92 Expressly rejecting
the court of appeals' conclusion that all ADEA claims against the state were barred
by constitutional sovereign immunity, 9 3 the court noted that nothing in Alden, 94

182. See supra notes 105-133 and accompanying text.
183. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, IN 11-12,90 P.3d at 496. The court did not address the second Alden exception
to sovereign immunity, suits against entities that are not considered an arm of the state. See supra notes 101-102
and accompanying text.
184. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 13, 90 P.3d at 496-97 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000)); see supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
185. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1 13,90 P.3d at 496-97 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Cockrell
v. Bd. of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, 45 P.3d 876).
186. Id.; see supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
187. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 13, 90 P.3d at 497.
188. Id. 13, 90 P.3d at 497.
189. Id. 14, 90 P.3d at 497.
190. Id.
191. Id. 115,90P.3dat497.
192. Id; see supra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
193. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 15, 90 P.3d at 497.
194. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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Kimel,'95 or Cockrell96 supported the court of appeals' holding. 97 Concluding that
not all ADEA claims against the state are barred because Congress, in passing the
that an
ADEA, did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, the court decided
98
ADEA claim may be litigated against the state under Ex parte Young. 1
After recognizing Exparte Young as the valid Alden exception in the case at bar,
the court then examined the history of the doctrine, noting that it was narrowed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the late 1990s.' 99 Although the doctrine of Ex parte
Young was limited in its scope by those decisions, the New Mexico Supreme Court
pointed out that the doctrine still "retains its full vitality. '' 2°° In support of this claim,
the court cited to Verizon Maryland,Inc. v. PublicService Commission, in which
the Supreme Court allowed a suit based on the Telecommunications Act to proceed
under Ex parte Young.2 °2 The court recognized that the Supreme Court had
distinguished Verizon Maryland, Inc. from Seminole Tribe 3 by stating that the
Telecommunications Act did not have a comprehensive remedial scheme like the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 204 The court noted that, like the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, the ADEA also has a comprehensive remedial scheme.2"5 The court
was able to distinguish the two situations, however, by concluding that Gill had
followed the requirements of the remedial scheme before filing his lawsuit;
therefore, the injunctive relief he was seeking was consistent with the ADEA's own
remedial scheme. 2' According to the court, Gill followed the remedial scheme by
first filing his charges with the EEOC and then not suing until after he received a
"right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC. 20 7 Therefore, the problem in Seminole Tribe of
a remedial scheme in a statute barring the use of Ex parte Young was not an issue
provided the plaintiff followed the proper remedial scheme prior
for ADEA suits,
208
to filing suit.
After deciding that the doctrine of Ex parte Young was applicable for ADEA
claims against the state, the court then had to decide if the suit was still barred due
to the fact that Congress exceeded its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment in passing the ADEA. 209 To answer this question, the court revisited the
Supreme Court's holdings in Kimel2 ° and Garrett.21 ' The court stated that Garrett

195. See supra notes 92-100, 168-169 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
197. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 15, 90 P.3d at 497.
198. Id.
199. Id. 18, 90 P.3d at 497-98; see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). For a discussion of the history and development ofExparte Young, see supra notes
105-133.
200. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 19, 90 P.3d at 498.
201. 535 U.S. 635 (2002); see supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
202. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1 19, 90 P.3d at 498 (citing Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 647).
203. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
204. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 19, 90 P.3d at 498 (citing Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 647).

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see supra note 150.
208. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016,

19,90 P.3d at 498.

209. Id.
210. See supra notes 92-100, 168-169 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 132-133, 170 and accompanying text.
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had answered the question left open in Kimel, namely, that a statute that invalidly
abrogates state sovereign immunity can still be enforced against states through the
doctrine of Ex parte Young.2 2 Based on these cases, the court concluded that a
sovereign immunity bar to suit did not render the ADEA unenforceable against the
state; therefore, Ex parte Young still remained a valid route for injunctive relief
against the state to enforce violations of the ADEA.213 Thus, the court reasoned, "the
Court of Appeals' conclusion in Gill's case that Congress lacked the power to make
the ADEA
applicable to the states [was] incorrect as a matter of constitutional
2 14
law."

In fact, the court noted that in State Policefor Automatic Retirement Ass'n v.
2 15 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had dealt with the same
DiFava,
issue decided in Gill and, unlike the court of appeals, found that Kimel did not
render the ADEA inapplicable to states.2 16 The First Circuit subsequently "upheld
an injunction under Exparte Young for prospective relief under the ADEA. 21 7 The
First Circuit further reinforced the idea that federal legislation that exceeded
Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment could still be
enforced against states under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 2 8 The court in Gill
stated that such available recourse had also been recognized by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Cockrell,219 when the court stated that declaratory or injunctive
relief were possible forms of relief, even under a federal statute that had been found
ineffective for purposes of abrogating state sovereign immunity.2 The court then
concluded that "[n]o heightened immunity is bestowed upon states by virtue of a
finding that Congress cannot abrogate state immunity in a given statute"; rather,
immunity is limited to suits for monetary damages, and other exceptions to
sovereign immunity still remain applicable.22 '
Noting that DiFava and Garrett "applied Ex parte Young in federal court, not
state court," the court in Gill concluded that Alden confirmed that Ex parte Young
applies in state courts as well.12' Basing its reasoning on Alden, the court in Gill
concluded that if states enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought in state courts,

212. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 21, 90 P.3d at 498-99.
213. Id. 20,90 P.3d at 498.
214. Id.
215. 317 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2003). In DiFava, police officers sought an injunction under the ADEA to prevent

Massachusetts from requiring mandatory retirement for police officers when they reached the age of fifty-five. Id.
at 7-8. In allowing the injunction to stand, the court reasoned,
[t]hus, even though private individuals are precluded by the Eleventh Amendment from suing
the Commonwealth for money damages for violations ofthe ADEA, the provisions of the ADEA
remain fully applicable and may be enforced against the Commonwealth in the manner
described. Kimel has not so altered the legal landscape as to invalidate the permanent
injunction....
Id. at 12. Similar reasoning was followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Meekison v.
Voinovich, 67 Fed. Appx. 900, 901 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that, although sovereign immunity barred a suit against
the state under the ADEA and ADA for money damages, the plaintiff may still be able to obtain injunctive relief).
216. Gill, 2004-NMSC-01 6, 22, 90 P.3d at 499 (citing DiFava,317 F.3d at 11-12).
217. Id. (citing DiFava,317 F.3d at 11-12).
218. Id. 23, 90 P.3d at 499 (citingDiFava,317 F.3d at 12).
219. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
220. Id. (citing Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents, 2002-NMSC-009, 9, 45 P.3d at 28).
221. Id.
222. Id. 24, 90 P.3d at 499 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999)).
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then Ex parte Young, as an exception to state sovereign immunity, must be
applicable in state courts as well.223 The court reasoned that even though the doctrine
of Ex parte Young is a legal fiction, it is an important "attempt to strike a balance
between respect for the dignity and autonomy of the state, and the need to maintain
the supremacy of federal law., 224 The court recognized that several post-Alden cases
have also reinforced this contention.225 In holding Exparte Young applicable to New
Mexico state courts, the court then stated that the next step in its analysis would be
to decide whether Gill had satisfied the four procedural requirements of Ex parte
Young: "(1) the plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation of federal law; (2) the suit
must not implicate special state sovereignty interests; (3) the relief sought must be
[and] (4) the suit must be directed at officers of the state,
prospective and injunctive;
226
and not the state itself."

1. Alleged Conduct Violates Federal Law
The first procedural requirement of Ex parte Young is that the alleged conduct
must violate federal law.227 Noting that, because the "ADEA remains applicable to
states," the court in Gill applied the U.S. Supreme Court's "straightforward inquiry"
to determine whether Gill's complaint, on its face, alleged an ongoing violation of
the ADEA.228 The court stated that such an inquiry is all that is necessary to satisfy
the first procedural requirement of Ex parte Young, and held that Gill had satisfied
the requirement by "making a prima facie showing of an ADEA violation. 229 To
make a prima facie showing, Gill had to allege "that he was treated adversely in his
employment because of his age, and that he was at least 40 years of age at the time
met this requirement, the court
of the alleged discrimination., 230 Satisfied that Gill
23
moved on to the second procedural requirement. 1
2. Special State Interests Must Not Be Implicated by the Lawsuit
The court then stated that even when a party is able to demonstrate an ongoing
violation of federal law, the suit may still be blocked if the "requested relief is 'far
reaching and intrusive' on core state functions, or 'an impermissible affront' to the

223. See id.
224. Id. 25, 90 P.3d at 499-500.
225. Id. The court cites numerous state cases to support the proposition that Exparte Young is an exception
to sovereign immunity for suits for prospective injunctive relief. Id. (citing Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721, 727
(Colo. 2002); Purvis v. Williams, 73 P.3d 740, 749 (Kan. 2003); Connolly v. State Highway Patrol, 26 P.3d 1246,
1259 (Kan. 2001); Prager v. State Dep't of Revenue, 20 P.3d 39, 55 (Kan. 2001); Brown v. Div. of Motor Vehicles,
573 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).

226. Id. 26, 90 P.3d at 500.
227. Id. 27, 90 P.3d at 500 (citing Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
228. Id. (citing Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 645).
229. Id.

230. Id.
231.

Id.
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state's political authority. 2 32 The court noted that this exception to Exparte Young
was carved out by ANR Pipeline Co. v. LaFaver233 and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, which
together held that states' interests in property tax schemes and submerged lands,
respectively, were "sufficiently special state interest[s] to bar an Ex parte Young
' Classifying Coeur d'Alene Tribe and ANR Pipeline as cases that reflect
action."234
"extreme and unusual cases," the court stated that, in general, special state interest
exceptions are not implicated in most Exparte Young cases.235 In fact, the court in
Gill noted, outside of the taxation or land use context,2 36 courts have allowed Ex
parte Young suits in a variety of areas, "including management of social and
management of trust lands, and the
educational programs, welfare distribution,
23 7
reappropriation of surplus funds.
Based on these cases, the court in Gill concluded that it was not convinced that
an ADEA claim was an "impermissible affront to New Mexico's special sovereign
interests or its political autonomy., 238 In coming to this conclusion, the court
observed that the state had already created a remedy for age discrimination in the
New Mexico Human Rights Act,239 which potentially had the ability to impact the
state's treasury more than an ADEA claim for prospective, injunctive relief under
Ex parte Young.24 ° Therefore, Gill's ADEA claim under Ex parte Young would
interests than what an aggrieved plaintiff could
likely be less intrusive on the state's
241
already obtain under state law.

232. Id. 28, 90 P.3d at 500 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281-83 (1997); Elephant
Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Dep't of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 612-13 (10th Cit. 1998)).
233. 150 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1998).
234. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 28, 90 P.3d at 500-01 (citing Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281-83
(holding that state officials could not be sued under Exparte Young because the state had a special sovereign interest
in submerged land within its borders); ANR Pipeline Co., 150 F.3d at 1194 (holding that a state's property tax
scheme was a special sovereign interest sufficient to bar relief under Ex parte Young)).
235. Id. 29, 90 P.3d at 500-01.
236. See id. 28,90 P.3d at 500-01 (citing Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281-83; ANR Pipeline Co., 150
F.3d at 612-13).
237. Id. 29, 90 P.3d at 501 (citing Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 261 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the administration of Medicaid program was not a special sovereignty interest); Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr.,
163 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that the state's interest in limiting medical residency criteria for school
admission was not a core sovereign interest); Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1260-61 (10th Cir.
2002) (noting that welfare distribution was not a sufficient special sovereign interest to bar Ex parte Young);
Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 632 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that managing trust lands was not
acore sovereign interest); Harris v. Owens, 264 F.3d 1282, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that the state's interest
in managing tobacco settlement funds was not core sovereign interest)).
238. Id. 30, 90 P.3d at 501.
239. NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (2004). Under the New Mexico Human Rights Act, it is unlawful for
an employer, unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification or other statutory
to discharge, to promote or demote or to discriminate in matters of
prohibition, to refuse to hire,
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment against any person otherwise
qualified because of race, age, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, physical or mental
handicap or serious medical condition, or, if the employer has fifty or more employees, spousal
affiliation; provided, however, that 29 U.S.C. Section 631(c)(1) and (2) shall apply to
discrimination based on age; or, if the employer has fifteen or more employees, to discriminate
against an employee based upon the employee's sexual orientation or gender identity.
Id.§ 28-1-7(A) (2004).
240. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 30, 90 P.3d at 501 (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-7(A), 28-1-2(A) (1993)).
241. See id.
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3. Relief Desired Is Prospective and Injunctive
According to the court, the third procedural requirement of Exparte Young is that
the relief sought must be prospective and injunctive.242 Although an Exparte Young
claim may have an impact on the state's treasury, the key inquiry is not whether the
claim will affect state monies, but rather, whether "the relief will remedy past
wrongs., 243 The court recognized that actions for prospective relief under Ex parte
when the award "would have a 'substantial ancillary
Young have been allowed even
2 44
effect on the state treasury.' ,
In addition to noting that it is permissible to allow Ex parte Young claims even
when the relief may affect the state's treasury, the court expressly disagreed with the
defendant's contention that Gill's claim was a "raid" on New Mexico's treasury.245
The court reasoned that Gill's claim would be paid by the Volunteer Firefighter's
Retirement Fund (VFRF), which was segregated from the state's general fund, as
well as from other state retirement funds. 2' Additionally, the VFRF received the
same appropriation every year, so providing Gill with benefits would not affect the
amount of money in the VFRF's funding for the next year 247
Based on that analysis, the court concluded that Gill's claim for prospective,
injunctive relief only had an ancillary effect on the state's treasury and was a
permissible claim under Exparte Young. 24' The court reasoned that Gill was seeking
"to enjoin future violations of the ADEA," and the fact that Gill would obtain some
financial benefit from the suit was merely incidental to preventing an ongoing
violation of federal law.249 The court further recognized that New Mexico has a
"constitutional obligation to comply with federal law," necessitating that the court
not turn a "blind eye" to Gill's predicament even though he may obtain some
financial benefit to the detriment of the state's treasury.2 0 After reaching this
conclusion, the court moved on to address the final procedural requirement of Ex
parte Young.25'
4. Proper Party Defendants
The court stated that, in traditional Ex parte Young suits, the plaintiff names
"individual state officers to be sued in their official capacities." 25 2 According to the
court, the purpose behind this requirement is two-fold; first, naming an individual
state officer serves to identify "whose conduct violated federal law," and, second,
such a designation serves to "ensure that future conduct conforms to federal law. 253
To determine whether a plaintiff has named the proper defendants in an Ex parte

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. 26, 90 P.3d at 500.
Id. 31,90 P.3d at 501.
Id. 32, 90 P.3d at 501 (quoting ANR Pipeline Co. v. LaFaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Id. 33, 90 P.3d at 502.
Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 10-11A-3 (1997)).
Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 10-1 1A-3(B) (1983); 2002 Supp. Comment on "Appropriations").
Id. 1 34, 90 P.3d at 502.
See id.
Id. (citing Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 903 (2004)).
Id
34, 90 P.3d at 502.
Id. 35, 90 P.3d at 502 (citing Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).

253. Id.
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Young action, the court must first decide whether the "state is the real party 255
in
interest 254 by examining the "essential nature and effect of the proceeding.
According to the court, this inquiry is designed to insure
that a suit will not "intrude
256
upon the sovereignty and autonomy of the State.
The court concluded that Gill's claim was directed towards the PERB, not an
individual state official.25 7 Gill's argument that the PERB is comprised of many
individual state officials did not pass muster with the court, which restated its
understanding that an essential requirement of an Exparte Young action was that the
plaintiff name individual state officials.25 8 The court decided to remand the case to
allow Gill to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 1-015(C) NMRA, 259 because the
PERB was on notice of Gill's suit and the amended complaint arose "out of the
conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading. '26 Having concluded that Gill met three of the four Ex parte
Young requirements, the court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case
to district court to allow Gill to amend his complaint to meet the final Ex parte
Young requirement.2 6'
C. Justice Minzner's Special Concurrence
Although Justice Minzner agreed with the majority's opinion, she wrote
separately to emphasize the importance of Cockrell,2 2 which Justice Minzner
believed recognized a key anomaly within this area of constitutional law.263
According to Justice Minzner, this anomaly merited discussion because it was also
acknowledged by the court of appeals in Gill.264 Additionally, Justice Minzner
wanted to emphasize that the approach
adopted by the court in Cockrell was one
"we should continue to pursue., 265

254. Id.
255. Id.(quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997) (quoting In re New York, 256 U.S.
490, 500 (1921))).
256. d.
257. Id. 36, 90 P.3d at 502.
258. Id. ("The requirement that a plaintiff must sue a state official in an Er parte Young claim remains an
integral component of the Exparte Young construct.").
259. Rule 1-015(C) NMRA states:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in
by amendment:
1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in
maintaining his defense on the merits; and
2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against him.
260. Gill, 2004-NMSC-009, 37, 90 P.3d at 502-03 (quoting Rule 1-015(C) NMRA).
261. Id. T1 37-38, 90 P.3d at 503.
262. 2002-NMSC-009, 45 P.3d 876.
263. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 40, 90 P.3d at 503 (Minzner, J., specially concurring).

264. Id.
265. Id.
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In Cockrell, Justice Minzner noted, the court had "discussed the effect of several
opinions by the United States Supreme Court on issues of federalism." 2" According
to Justice Minzner, this discussion resulted in the conclusion that states enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit absent consent.267 However, in the absence of consent,
Justice Minzner noted, federal laws are still binding on the states.26 Starting from
that presumption, Justice Minzner stated that the anomaly recognized in both
Cockrell and the court of appeals' decision in Gill concerned the use of the doctrine
of Ex parte Young by courts to allow suits to enforce federal rights or laws against
states when some U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggested that Congress did not
have the power to make such laws enforceable against states.269 Justice Minzner
further explained, "[i]f the Constitution limited Congressional power to make
federal legislation applicable to the states, then it should be the case (not necessarily
is the case) that the Ex parte Young doctrine.. .would not be available to facilitate
what Congress.. .did not have the power under the Constitution to accomplish."27
Justice Minzner noted that the court of appeals in Gill resolved this anomaly by
ruling that Ex parte Young could not be used to enforce federal laws that are
"constitutionally outside of Congress's power to enact as against the states.""27
To address this anomaly, Justice Minzner revisited Cockrell, using it to conclude
that federal statutes that may be unenforceable against states due to various
constitutional concerns remain valid federal laws.272 Justice Minzner recognized that
the constitutional concern in Gill was whether Congress's failure to properly
abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits for money damages in the ADEA
barred any possible relief by aggrieved plaintiffs.273 Justice Minzner concluded that
these types of federal statutes were still binding on states in actions for which states
were not immune, such as claims for prospective, injunctive relief.2 74 Therefore,
concluded Justice Minzner, constitutional sovereign immunity should not foreclose
Gill's claim as it was not an action that sovereign immunity covered.275 Justice
Minzner further noted that in choosing not to dismiss the complaint, the court should
equate the defendant's conduct with Ex parte Young's historically recognized
conduct and allow the claim to proceed in state court.276
Justice Minzner was also concerned that, on its face, the opinion expressed by the
majority might seem inconsistent with Cockrell, because it seemed as if the court
was exercising the "legislature's prerogative" to waive state sovereign immunity, a

266. Id.1 41, 90 P.3d at 503.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.n 41, 48, 90 P.3d at 503, 505.
270. Id. 48, 90 P.3d at 504.
271. Id. 1 48,90 P.3d at 505 (quoting Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2003-NMCA-038, 12,62 P.3d 1227,
1230).
272. Id. 47, 90 P.3d at 504.
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. Id. 147, 90 P.3d at 504.
276. Id. -H 46, 49, 90 P.3d at 504, 505 ("In the past, the doctrine of Ex parne Young has permitted suits in
federal courts against individual state officers on the basis that when acting illegally, those officers should be viewed
as stripped of the immunity they otherwise would enjoy as representatives of a sovereign state.").

Summer 2005]

SUITS AGAINST THE STATE

role explicitly relegated to the legislature by the court in Cockrell.277 Justice Minzner
noted that in Cockrell the court had stated, "We do not believe that it is within this
Court's province to decide whether the State should subject itself to liability for a
federal claim filed in state court. Under the principle of separation of powers.. .we
believe this is a matter for the Legislature., 27 8 Justice Minzner found that, although
applying Ex parte Young in Gill suggested that Congress could abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity whenever it desired, even when a state did not consent
to suit, Cockrell emphasized the point that constitutional sovereign immunity is a
limited doctrine.279 Justice Minzner noted that the doctrine is limited in the sense
that it applies only to the "limited context of a private action for money damages
authorized by a federal statute. 2 81 Justice Minzner argued that although only the
legislature should decide whether the state should waive its immunity in certain
circumstances and subject itself to liability, courts could use Ex parte Young 28
to
subject states to suits that are outside the realm of state sovereign immunity. '
Therefore, Justice Minzner reasoned, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, used in
deciding whether a state can be subject to a suit that it has not otherwise waived its
consent to, is explicitly in the hands of the court, not the legislature.282 Although
some might fear that the courts were usurping the legislative role in deciding
whether sovereign immunity applied, Justice Minzner concluded that suits for
prospective, injunctive relief were not covered by constitutional sovereign
immunity, and, therefore, exposing states to suits for such relief was in the hands of
the courts.283
Justice Minzner also raised two other concerns with the majority's opinion. 2"
First, she questioned whether Ex parte Young should be stretched beyond its
historical limits. 285 Justice Minzner stated that historically, Ex parte Young applied
in federal courts to permit suits against state officials acting illegally. 286 However,
in Gill, Justice Minzner noted that the state officials were not acting illegally, but
rather, in reliance on a state statute.28 7 Thus, according to Justice Minzner, the effect
of the majority opinion was to declare an "action taken pursuant to a state statute
illegal" if it conflicted with federal law.2 8
Justice Minzer's second concern was whether Gill was actually seeking
prospective, injunctive relief.28 9 Even if the defendant's conduct fits into Exparte
Young's historical purpose, Justice Minzner noted that injunctive relief can be just

277. Id. 43, 90 P.3d at 503; see infra Part V.B.
278. Gill, 2004-NMSC-009, 42, 90 P.3d at 504 (Minzner, J., specially concurring) (quoting Cockrell v. Bd.
of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, 1 13, 45 P.3d 876, 883).
279. Id. 44, 90 P.3d at 504.
280. Id.
281. Id. 44, 45, 90 P.3d at 504.
282. Id. 44, 90 P.3d at 504.

283. Id.
284. See id. 46, 90 P.3d at 504.

285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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as threatening to a state's treasury as other forms of relief.29 ° In this situation,
however, Justice Minzner concluded that the existence of a separate retirement fund
made it possible to categorize the effect on New Mexico's treasury as merely
ancillary. 29' Therefore, Justice Minzner believed that Gill's claim was in fact a claim
for prospective injunctive relief that fell within the scope of Ex parte Young.292
Having concluded that the relief sought in Gill was appropriate under Ex parte
Young, Justice Minzner concurred in the majority opinion.293
V. ANALYSIS
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court in Gill correctly held that sovereign
immunity did not bar James Gill's suit under the doctrine of Exparte Young, 294 the
court could have done more to clarify several seeming inconsistencies between its
decision in Gill and its prior holding in Cockrell.295 This analysis addresses the
decision in Gill, focusing both on the reasoning of the decision itself and on the
failure of the court to adequately discuss Cockrell. Further, this analysis will argue
that the holdings in the two cases are not inconsistent with one another, although
they might appear so due to the muddled explanation in Cockrell as to why the
plaintiff was barred from seeking relief against the state for violations of the FLSA.
Additionally, in terms of the Gill decision itself, this analysis suggests that perhaps
part of the problem with the court's inability to adequately distinguish Cockrell from
Gill was that Gill's requested relief raised the question as to whether such relief was
indeed appropriate under Ex parte Young.296
A. The Application of Sovereign Immunity and Ex parte Young in Gill
The court of appeals in Gill rejected James Gill's Exparte Young claim because
it concluded that Ex parte Young could not be used to enforce a statute that had
invalidly abrogated state sovereign immunity.297 While acknowledging that this
scenario represented a "historical anomaly '2 98 with respect to Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Gill correctly concluded that
sovereign immunity did not bar an ADEA suit under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young. 299 This conclusion is correct for a number of reasons.
As previously discussed, congressional abrogation is only one of the possible
exceptions to state sovereign immunity in any suit against the state.3"' Where the

290. Id. 1 50, 90 P.3d at 505.
291. Id.
292. Id. 9H 46, 50, 90 P.3d at 504-05.
293. Id. 1 50, 90 P.3d at 505-06.
294. See id. 1 1, 90 P.3d at 494-95 (majority opinion); see also supraPart Bl.C.
295. 2002-NMSC-009, 24, 45 P.3d 876, 887.
296. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 46, 90 P.3d at 504 (Minzner, J., specially concurring).
297. See Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2003-NMCA-038, 12, 62 P.3d at 1230; see also supranote 161
and accompanying text.
298. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 47, 90 P.3d at 504 (Minzner, J., specially concurring) ("The Court of Appeals
seems... to make a valid point in suggesting the historical anomaly of relying on Ex parte Young to preserve the
supremacy of federal law in state court when some of the language in the federal cases suggests Congress lacked
the power to make the law supreme.").
299. See id.
1 1, 90 P.3d at 494 (majority opinion); see also supra notes 184-208 and accompanying text.
300. See supranotes 75-104 and accompanying text.
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court of appeals in Gill went wrong in its analysis was in concluding that, if one of
the exceptions to state sovereign immunity was not met, none of the exceptions were
applicable.3"' Luckily for James Gill, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized
that this conclusion is clearly not valid.30 2 Although the ADEA was not a proper
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity, the other exceptions to state
sovereign immunity were still valid routes by which the ADEA could be enforced.30 3
This is because the ADEA, although it did not abrogate state sovereign immunity
for private suits for money damages, still remained applicable to the states and
therefore enforceable, albeit in more limited circumstances. 3 4 In this manner, it can
be said that the Eleventh Amendment "provides, at most, an immunity from certain
sorts of remedies, not an immunity from substantive federal regulation."3 5 In other
words, "[t]he Amendment limits the enforcement mechanisms Congress can
establish to give efficacy to the obligations it imposes on the states, but it does not
limit Congress power to impose obligations on the states in the first instance. 30 6
Thus, even when Congress exceeds its power in attempting to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, the federal statute still remains applicable to the states. While
the majority in Gill recognized this point and correctly decided the case, it failed to
address a number of important issues arising from its earlier decision in Cockrell,
making Justice Minzner's special concurrence particularly important and helpful in
clearing up any confusion left over from Cockrell.
B. The Cockrell Decision
The court of appeals in Gill touted the case as the "sequel" to Cockrell3 °7 and,
indeed, building off of the decision in Cockrell, Gill provided an opportunity for the
New Mexico Supreme Court to continue to clarify and develop its application of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in the State of New Mexico. 30 8 Although some
of the language in Cockrell seems broad and potentially misleading with respect to
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, 3 9 any apparent inconsistencies between the
two decisions can be reconciled through a closer reading of the Cockrell decision

301. See Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2003-NMCA-038, 9, 62 P.3d 1227, 1229-30.
302. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 10, 90 P.3d at 495-96; see also, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124
S. Ct. 899, 903 (2004) (applying the exception of ExparteYoung and determining that it was unnecessary to address
other possible exceptions); Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (stating other
options for recourse in the absence of valid congressional abrogation); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999)
(describing the exceptions to state sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996)
(examining both congressional abrogation and Exparte Young as potential exceptions to sovereign immunity).
303. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
304. Id. ("Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity... does not
mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still
prescribes standards applicable to the States.").
305. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unravelingof
the Prospective-RetrospectiveDistinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine,87 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (1998).

306. Id.
307. Gill v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2003-NMCA-038, 1, 62 P.3d 1227, 1227.
308. Id.; see Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1, 90 P.3d at 494-95.
309. See, e.g., Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, 15, 45 P.3d 876, 884
("This State, by virtue of its sovereign role in the Union, is constitutionally immune from private suits for damages
under a federal statute.").
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itself, and through Justice Minzner's special concurrence in Gill, which discusses
Cockrell in some depth.31
The court's decision in Cockrell raises a number of potential issues concerning
the proper role of the judiciary, Congress, and state legislatures with respect to state
sovereign immunity. In stating that it was solely a decision for the legislature
whether to subject the state to private suits for damages under federal law-"[i]f the
State is to consent to Congress's encroachment on this vital aspect of federalism, it
must be a decision of the Legislature"--the court in Cockrell did not fully explain
the role the judiciary plays with respect to state sovereign immunity.3" This is a
point clarified by Justice Minzner's special concurrence in Gill: Cockrell's holding
that decisions on waivers for damages are for the legislature has no effect on the
historic power of the judiciary to avoid a sovereign immunity barrier in cases for
prospective, injunctive relief under Exparte Young.312 In fact, the judicially created
doctrine of Exparte Young has been used to avoid a sovereign immunity bar to suit
for almost a century.313 Although the court in Cockrelldid acknowledge that certain
suits for declaratory or injunctive relief, namely Ex parte Young suits, were not
barred by state sovereign immunity,314 at first glance the language of the Cockrell
opinion itself seems to place far too much power in the hands of state legislatures
and to diminish the ability of the judiciary to fashion relief for aggrieved individuals. Justice Minzner in her special concurrence in Gill took advantage of this
potential inconsistency to reiterate that "the Legislature's power to waive.., constitutional sovereign immunity is the power to decide whether to expose the State to
liability for money damages for violations of federal law. Whether the doctrine of
Ex parte Young applies is a decision that the Court explicitly and appropriately
reserved for itself."31 5 The failure of the majority to clearly discuss this distinction
is one of the reasons that Cockrell may appear inconsistent with the court's opinion
was one of the key reasons for Justice Minzner's special
in Gill, and 31indeed
6
concurrence.
Another concern that the majority in Gill failed to address with respect to the
Cockrell opinion is a statement made by the court midway through the Cockrell
opinion: "This State, by virtue of its sovereign role in the Union, is constitutionally
immune from private suits for damages under a federal statute., 3 17 This statement
is an overly broad statement of the application of the Eleventh Amendment.
However, when this statement is read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph,
which discusses "Federal Acts that accord with the constitutional design, 318 it

310. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, U 40-45, 90 P.3d at 503-04 (Minzner, J., specially concurring).
311.
312.
313.
(10th Cir.

Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 15,45 P.3d at 884.
Gill, 2004-NMSC-016,1 45,90 P.3d at 504 (Minzner, J., specially concurring); see also supraPart ll.C.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996); Lewis v. N.M. Bd. of Health, 261 F.3d 970, 975
2001); see also supraPart Bl.C.

314. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 28, 45 P.3d at 888.
315. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 1 45, 90 P.3d at 504 (Minzner, J., specially concurring).
316. See id. 43, 90 P.3d at 503.
15,45 P.3d at 884.
317. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009,
318. Id. 1 14,45 P.3d at 884 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999)); see, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd.

of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000) ("Accordingly, the private petitioners in these cases may maintain their ADEA
suits.. .if, and only if, the ADEA is appropriate legislation under § 5."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 703, 756 (1999)
("We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the States to surrender a
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actually only implies that states are "constitutionally immune from private suits for
damages under a federal statute" when that statute does not validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity, as was the case with the FLSA.3 19
While states do enjoy sovereign immunity from private suits for damages
addressing violations of federal statutes that were not passed pursuant to Congress's
Section Five powers,32 ° they are clearly not immune from every private suit for
violations of federal law. 32 1 This point was not made entirely clear by the holding
in Cockrell, in which the court stated, "We hold that the State has not waived its
constitutional sovereign immunity from private suits for damages based on a
violation of federal law., 322 A more comprehensive explanation of the Cockrell
holding would be that Fletcher Cockrell could not assert his claims for money
damages based upon violations of the FLSA by the state because, in passing the
FLSA, Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits for
money damages.323 Further, in the absence of proper Section Five, Fourteenth
Amendment abrogation, New Mexico had not consented to private suits for
monetary damages under the FLSA, nor was the doctrine of Exparte Young applicable. Therefore, state sovereign immunity barred the suit.324 By expressly enumerating the roles played by the judiciary, Congress, and the state legislature with
respect to subjecting a state to suit for violations of federal law, the court's decision
in Gill clearly presented a better formulation of the U.S. Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence than was previously presented in Cockrell. This additional clarity will make it easier for both courts and parties to better address the
applicability of sovereign immunity within the State of New Mexico.
C. AppropriateRelief Under Ex parte Young
While the court in Gill did manage to clarify the interpretation of constitutional
state sovereign immunity that was presented in Cockrell, the court could have
distinguished Cockrellquickly and moved on to Gill's claims under Exparte Young.
The key difference between Fletcher Cockrell's claims and the claims put forth by
James Gill was that Cockrell sought monetary damages,325 while Gill sought
prospective injunctive relief, thereby invoking the doctrine of Exparte Young.3 26 A
key reason why the court did not distinguish the case on such grounds is that it is

portion of the sovereignty... so that Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to
its § 5 enforcement power."); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress has the power to
deny the States and their officials the right to rely on the nonconstitutional defense of sovereign immunity in an
action brought by one of their own citizens.").
319. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 1 14-15,45 P.3d at 884.
320. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 726-27 ("Congress may not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity pursuant
to its Article I power over commerce. Congress may, however, abrogate States' sovereign immunity through a valid
exercise of its § 5 power.") (citation omitted).
321. See supra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
322. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 29, 45 P.3d 876, 889.
323. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Ellis v. Univ. ofKan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[B]ecause Kansas has
not unmistakably waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Congress has not abrogated that immunity, the
Eleventh Amendment bars Ellis's suit.").
325. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 1,45 P.3d at 878.
326. Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 4, 90 P.3d at 494; see supra Parts U.C, IV.A.
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often difficult to distinguish between 327
retrospective and prospective types of relief

under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.

It is permissible for relief requested in an Ex parte Young suit to have "a
substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury," but it is impermissible for the court
to grant relief that essentially compensates "a party injured in the past by an action
of a state official., 321 What is especially problematic when drawing the line between
prospective and retrospective relief is that prospective relief is often just as taxing
on the state treasury as retrospective damages.32 9 The Gill case demonstrates this
core problem with the Supreme Court's prospective-retrospective distinction: "It
makes little sense for the Court to permit a prospective regulation, whose costs are
likely to dwarf the amount of damages relief, when its justification for denying
retrospective relief is in part the burden such relief places on the state treasury. 33 °
The burden that some permitted relief under Ex parte Young places on state
treasuries is indeed a concern, as protecting state treasuries was one of the key issues
discussed in the early state sovereign immunity debates. 3
There is an interesting paradox here: despite the concern for protecting state
treasuries, prospective relief is permitted in Ex parte Young suits, seemingly
irrespective of the potential effect that such suits will have on the state treasury. This
paradox, however, makes sense because it serves to further the goal of Ex parte
Young to ensure that federal law remains supreme:
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment
concerns, but the availability of prospective relief awarded in Ex parte Young

gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing
violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring
the supremacy of that law.332
In other words, prospective relief is permissible, even though it may have an effect
on a state's treasury, because it serves "[t]o ensure the enforcement of federal law,"

327. See generally Vazquez, supra note 304, at 2-3 (discussing the difficulties in determining what is
appropriate relief under Exparte Young). On the problems courts face with appropriate relief under Exparte Young,
Professor Vazquez writes:
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was closer to the mark when it wrote that drawing
the distinction that has evolved from Edelman "is more like examining a subject in that half-light
called the gloaming, where to identify it accurately one needs to have the instincts of Argos,
Odysseus' dog, who recognized his master dressed as a beggar upon his return home after twenty
years' absence." The truth is that even Argos would have difficulty navigating the Supreme
Court's doctrine in this area.
Id. at 3 (quoting N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, 50 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1995)).
328. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). With respect to state officials and proper relief under Ex
parte Young, the U.S. Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan stated that
[sltate officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the Court's decrees,
would more likely have to spend money from the state treasury than if they had been left free
to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a
permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Exparte Young.
415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)
329. Karlan, supra note 6, at 1329.
330. Id.
331. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
332. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
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whereas retrospective relief compensates aggrieved individuals but does not ensure
that the state will comply with federal law in the future.333
The difficulty in distinguishing between permissible and impermissible types of
relief under Ex parte Young can be illustrated through a comparison between the
types of relief sought in Gill and Cockrell.Although Fletcher Cockrell did not make
an Ex parte Young claim, it is notable that there are similarities between the types
of damages that Gill and Cockrell sought. 334 Both plaintiffs sought compensation
based upon work done in the past. In Gill, James Gill sought an injunction
prohibiting state officials from enforcing a New Mexico statute against him that was
in violation of the ADEA. 335 This injunction would essentially serve to provide Gill
with monetary relief, as the PERB would have to begin paying Gill retirement
benefits-payments that would draw from state monies, albeit from a fund separate
from the state treasury.336 Although Gill's relief may appear retrospective in the
sense that, if ultimately successful, he will obtain benefits for past service credits
earned, the overriding factor in the court's decision to allow Gill's claim to proceed
under Ex parte Young was to stop an on-going violation of federal law. This is a
permissible form of relief because "relief that serves to directly bring about an end
to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even
though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury."3 3
Hypothetically, an award of injunctive relief in Gill's case could serve to prevent the
state from applying a law that clearly violated the ADEA, thereby preventing future
firefighters from enduring the same fate suffered by Gill.338 On the other hand, in
Cockrell, the plaintiff sought compensation for overtime hours he had previously
worked.339 Nothing in Cockrell's case would have prevented other basketball
coaches from being denied overtime pay by the state, except perhaps awareness by
the state that it could potentially be liable for its actions.
Another crucial distinction between the two cases is that the compensation in
Cockrell was retrospective in the sense that it was money owed to Cockrell, but
withheld by the state.3 '° In Gill,however, the damages were prospective because the
plaintiff did not seek payment of past benefits owed by the state. 34' However, in
spite of the differences between these two cases, both plaintiffs essentially filed suit

333. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 903 (2004).
334. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 43, 90 P.3d at 504 (Minzner, J., specially concurring).
335. Id.
336. See id. 4, 50, 90 P.3d at 494, 505. The fact that the pension benefits paid to Gill would be paid from
a fund separate from the state treasury allowed the court to truly characterize the relief sought as ancillary as it did
not draw directly from the state's treasury. See id. U 33, 50, 90 P.3d at 501-02, 505.
337. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).
338. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-16, [ 34,90 P.3d at 502. Future firefighters have been spared from enduring the
same fate suffered by Gill: as previously noted, the relevant state law has been amended. See supra note 147.
339. Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents, 2002-NMSC-009, 2, 45 P.3d 876, 878.
340. See id.; see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 (holding that "payment of a very substantial amount of money
which the court held should have been paid, but was not" was impermissible relief under Ex parte Young).
341. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 4, 90 P.3d at 494; see also Lewis v. N.M. Bd. of Health, 261 F.3d 970,
977-78 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The plaintiffs in the case.. .clearly seek prospective equitable relief: they ask that state
officials be compelled to comply with federal statutes that allegedly entitle them to the reasonably prompt provision
of waiver services. They are not.. .asking to be reimbursed for past.. services.").
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to remedy past wrongs, 342
which once again begs the question as to the appropriateness
of Gill's desired relief.
The difficulty in trying to distinguish between the allowable forms of relief under
Exparte Young likely played a role in the court's inability to properly distinguish
its decision in Gill from Cockrell. As Justice Minzner stated in her concurrence in
Gill, these "distinctions we are making may seem thin, 343 and, indeed, perhaps the
court in Gill was correct to avoid distinguishing Gill and Cockrell on the basis of
relief sought. The issues with the proper application of Ex parte Young, coupled
with the difficulties many lower courts face in interpreting Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the Eleventh Amendment, often leave aggrieved individuals
without recourse for state violations of federal law. 344 However, the doctrine of Ex
parte Young still retains its vitality and remains an important tool in maintaining the
supremacy of federal law-a tool with renewed
importance in light of the current
345
Supreme Court's expansion of federalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
President Abraham Lincoln once stated, "It is as much the duty of Government
to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the
same between private individuals.",346 In light of current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the duty propounded by the former President has fallen on deaf
ears. 347 With the federalist revolution in full swing, individuals are often unable to
pursue claims based on violations of federal law against the states and state
entities. 34' The "fiction" of Ex parte Young, however, still provides individuals an

342. See Vazquez, supra note 304, at 24 ("The Court thus focuses on the time of the conduct complained of,
suggesting that if the plaintiff is complaining about, and seeking relief from, conduct that already took place, she
is seeking retrospective relief.").
343. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, 50, 90 P.3d at 505 (Minzner, J., specially concurring).
344. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, 27, 45 P.3d at 888 ("The seemingly inconsistent positions taken by the
Supreme Court.. .appears [sic] to have resulted in a right without a remedy, or at least without the complete and
direct remedy that was intended by Congress. The inherent unfairness of this dichotomy is not lost on this court.")
(citations omitted). See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000) (dismissing plaintiffs' ADEA
claim against Florida as barred by state sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding
that sovereign immunity barred plaintiffs' suit under the FLSA against Maine); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 47 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit against Florida for violations of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act and holding Ex parte Young inapplicable).
345. Massey, supranote 12, at 432.
346. Erwin Chemerinsky The Supreme Court,Federalism,andState SovereignImmunity: Against Sovereign
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1223-24 (2001) (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327
U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
347. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001).
348. See supra note 6. According to Calvin Massey,
[T]he Rehnquist Court has revived judicially enforceable federalism in four important ways: by
limiting the source of congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, by
limiting the scope of Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and reducing
judicial deference to congressional judgments about the scope of that power, by reducing
substantially the degree ofjudicial deference to congressional determination of the scope of the
commerce power, and by immunizing states from certain ways in which Congress might exercise
its commerce power.
Massey, supra note 12, at 431 citations omitted).
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avenue by which to seek justice. 349 Although limited since its inception, the doctrine
retains its vitality and provides a means by which courts can maintain the supremacy
of federal law."' The court in Gill recognized the need for Ex parte Young and,
through its opinion, clarified the application of state sovereign immunity within
New Mexico. In the absence of a state waiver of sovereign immunity for claims
arising out of federal statutes, the New Mexico judiciary will likely continue to
further its duty of rendering "prompt justice"35 ' through the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.

349. See supra Part l.C; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment and the
PotentialEviscerationof Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997) ("The availability of such equitable relief,
under the so-called Ex parte Young doctrine, has long been accepted as a necessary counterbalance to the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal jurisdiction.").
350. See Gill,2004-NMSC-016,
19-20, 90 P.3d at 498; see also Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 10,
at 107 ("[T]he Ex parte Young fiction avoids some of the effects of the current Court's expansive interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment, and it has long been recognized that this fiction is critical in ensuring state compliance
with federal statutes." (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTS 292 (1983))).

351. See Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Federalism,and State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 345, at
1223-24 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp., 327 U.S. at 580 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

